Abstract-We examine the extent to which vertical and horizontal market structure can together explain incomplete retail pass-through. To answer this question, we use scanner data from a large U.S. retailer to estimate product level pass-through for three vertical structures: national brands, private label goods not manufactured by the retailer, and private label goods manufactured by the retailer. Our approach circumvents issues associated with internal firm prices and demonstrates that accounting for horizontal market structure is important for measuring the effects of vertical integration and reduced double marginalization on pass-through.
I. Introduction
U NDERSTANDING pass-through-the transmission of costs to prices-is critical to closed and open economy macroeconomics, with implications for inflation and the real effects of monetary policy. A large literature decomposes the sources of incomplete pass-through into components such as market power (markup adjustments); menu costs; and retailer, wholesaler, and manufacturing components (e.g., nontraded local and distribution costs). Within the literature on market power, some studies have focused on the role of horizontal competition, where the typical finding is that firms and products with larger market shares have lower cost pass-through. 1 Others have focused on the role of vertical integration, where the typical finding is that firms with more vertically integrated production stages exhibit higher rates of cost pass-through consistent with a reduction in double marginalization. 2 We contribute to this literature by examining cost passthrough with a focus on the identification of vertical relationships in retail and their interaction with horizontal competition. Using two scanner data sets that record prices and quantities for thousands of UPC bar codes, we document how pass-through from commodity to retail prices depends on the vertical and horizontal characteristics of goods. In doing so, we address several concerns raised about previous studies, specifically the identification of vertical relationships and the informativeness of intrafirm prices. We also show how failing to account for the interaction between vertical characteristics and horizontal competition can bias inference on the mechanism and relative magnitude of the factors generating differential pass-through.
We motivate our empirical analysis of commodity to retail price pass-through with a simple theoretical framework combining the Spengler (1950) model of vertical price-setting with the Dornbusch (1987) model of oligopolistic competition. The Dornbusch (1987) model predicts that firms with higher market share charge higher markups and, consequently, pass through less (by adjusting markups more) when hit by a cost shock. We embed this in Spengler's (1950) model of vertical price setting, which shows how arm'slength sequential price setting can lead to higher markups through double marginalization. Using our framework, we show that vertical integration can directly raise pass-through by reducing double marginalization while simultaneously lowering pass-through indirectly by raising market shares. While either effect could dominate empirically, conditioning on market power would raise the positive effect attributed to vertical integration in this case. We also show how intermediate costs (wholesale costs, i.e., the prices charged by manufacturers to retailers) behave in this model and derive predictions for partially integrated relationships where retailers have a wider range of responsibilities relative to manufacturers.
The first data we use are from a single large retailer and enable us to precisely identify products that are manufactured by the retailer, products that are branded by the retailer but manufactured by external firms, and national brand products that are manufactured and marketed by external firms. Although the first two classes of goods are usually classified together as private labels that increase retailer power relative to manufacturers, we find that distinguishing between the two is quantitatively important. Both types of private label goods exhibit higher pass-through of commodity to retail prices than national brands, but those manufactured by the retailer by a much larger margin. We find that accounting for a product or brand's share of sales within a retailer raises the estimated effect of vertical integration significantly, consistent with our model's predictions. While we find that brand share generally has a significant and negative relationship with pass-through like much of the literature, the vertical effects we find are much more important quantitatively.
Using data from multiple retailers from the Symphony IRI data set, we are able to consider other horizontal competition measures and consider a broader set of U.S. retailers. With these data, we show that retailer market power (e.g., the share of soft drink sales within the Los Angeles area going through a particular retail chain) and manufacturer market power (e.g., the share of soft drinks sales within Los Angeles for Pepsi versus Coca-Cola) can affect commodity to retail passthrough. Our finding is that pass-through is higher for private labels using this broader set of retailers and accounting for other horizontal competition variables. Although we again find that controlling for horizontal competition variables affects inference on the importance of vertical characteristics, the interactions in these data are more complicated and appear to be heterogeneous across retailers.
Methodologically, our empirical setting has several advantages for identifying vertical and horizontal determinants of pass-through. First, we are able to examine pass-through from one allocative price (commodity prices) to another (retail prices), similar to Berger et al. (2011) and Misra, Khan, and Singh (2010) . Many analyses of vertical pricing relationships rely on self-reported intrafirm prices, which may reflect transfer pricing (see Clausing, 2003, and Bernard, Jensen, & Schott, 2006) , and may not correspond to allocative transaction prices (see Nijs et al., 2009, and Anderson et al., 2013 , for the role of trade promotions in retail). 3 Second, we observe clearly defined vertical relationships along a continuum from full integration by the retailer to external manufacturing and marketing. This is advantageous compared to settings where intrafirm status is self-reported or based on vague ownership criteria that may not correspond to control rights. 4 Third, we have the quantity data necessary to analyze how horizontal competition affects pass-through and interacts with vertical relationships. These quantity data are often unavailable for high-frequency government surveys of consumer, producer, import, and export prices used to analyze pass-through. The multiretailer scanner data also allow us to consider several different measures of horizontal competition. 5 The retailer-manufacturer setting we analyze is important given recent trends in the retail industry. In the United States, the growth of retail giants like Walmart and repeated waves of retail consolidation underscore the potential importance of retailers as price-setting intermediaries. Between 1992 and 2009, the top five grocery retail concentration ratio rose from 30% to 60% for the average U.S. market. A simultaneous development is the increase of private label market share from 12% to 18% at the national level. The association between retailer size and private label introductions is stark in the international cross-section, where countries like the United Kingdom and Switzerland have top five retail concentration ratios around 85% and private label shares over 50%. 6 3 We present results using retailer self-reported wholesale costs, which behave as predicted by our model, but these data are subject to the same criticism.
4 Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) suggest that firms likely use the Bureau of Economic Analysis definition of a 10% ownership share. 5 We are unable to identify private label manufacturer identities, which limits inference on the manufacturer market share of private label manufacturers relative to national brands, but we explore the sensitivity of our results to different imputations. 6 Data from Wood (2013) , Hoch and Banerji (1993) , Hale (2011) , and Coriolos Research (2002) The marketing literature on private labels focuses on where private labels are successful and how their introduction affects static pricing and markups for national brand manufacturers (Hoch & Banerji, 1993; Raju, Sethuraman, & Dhar, 1995; Batra & Sinha, 2000; Chintagunta, Bonfrer, & Song, 2002) . Our work differs by focusing on price dynamics. This correlation is itself hardly surprising since smaller retail firms may find it less worthwhile to undertake manufacturing, product development, and marketing. But it raises important questions for market power and cost pass-through. Retail consolidation may raise retail markups and thereby lower pass-through. 7 However, it may also promote vertical integration through private label growth. Private label growth could raise pass-through by reducing double marginalization and reducing the market power of competing national brand manufacturers. While our data are not well suited to analyzing these aggregate implications of retail consolidation and private label introduction for pass-through, our microlevel results are a first step toward addressing this broader question of concern for competition and monetary policymakers. 8 Our paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents a model that links horizontal and vertical structure to cost pass-through and encompasses both retailer-manufactured and externally manufactured private labels to motivate our analysis. Section III describes our data. Section IV presents our main empirical findings on pass-through and associated robustness checks, while Section V concludes.
II. Model
Consider the classic double-marginalization problem analyzed in Spengler (1950) , for example, an oligopoly with a Stackelberg leader. The retailer takes its marginal cost as given and sets the price ( p i ) for brand i as a markup over marginal cost. This marginal cost is given by the wholesale cost (w i ) and an additional retailing cost (θ r i ) meant to capture factors related to distribution, inventory, advertising, and standard retail inputs like land, capital, labor, and energy. Some of these costs can be thought of as fixed costs in the short run, but some may have a marginal cost component (e.g., selling more products requires more cashiers). Retailer i's price-setting rule is the standard markup over marginal cost based on the elasticity of demand i :
The manufacturer sets the wholesale price, taking into account its own demand elasticity, which depends indirectly on the retailer. Manufacturer i has marginal cost c + θ . Manufacturers face a lower demand elasticity than retailers (μ i < i ) when 7 There could also be offsetting technological effects that lower distribution and retailer marginal costs, increasing pass-through. See Antoniades and Zaniboni (2013) for evidence that larger retailers have higher passthrough of exchange rate shocks for goods imported into the United Arab Emirates.
8 Longer-term trends in pass-through have been a particular focus in international price setting, where declining pass-through to import prices is the main finding (Bailliu & Bouakez, 2004) . In a domestic setting, Weinhagen (2002) has documented a similar decline in crude/intermediate input to CPI prices between 1974 CPI prices between -1989 CPI prices between and 1990 CPI prices between -2001 retail pass-through is below 1. In this case the manufacturer markup and the retailer markup are strategic substitutes. An increase in wholesale price is not fully passed through to consumers because retailers adjust their markups downward when their costs increase, making the quantity purchased less elastic to changes in wholesale prices than retail prices.
With both retailing and manufacturing firms following their respective pricing rules, the equilibrium retail price is
Equation (1) makes it explicit that retail and manufacturer markups over marginal cost give rise to double marginalization. Now consider the case where the retailer and manufacturer vertically integrate. The integrated firm internalizes the negative pricing externality. This implies a pricing rule given by
which eliminates the double marginalization in equation (1). This implies that the integrated firm will have lower retail prices and higher total profits:
Although under vertical integration, the total markup per unit sold is lower, the larger volume sold (q VI i > q i ) results in higher profits.
While the implications of vertical integration for pricing and profits are unambiguous, the implications for passthrough in this model are not. Commodity pass-through
while under arm's-length pricing, it is given by the combined retail and wholesale commodity price pass-through:
. (5) The arm's-length pass-through equation reveals that markup adjustment by manufacturers
can lower pass-through compared to the vertically integrated case. This first force for higher pass-through (markup adjustment channel) is relevant only when demand elasticities (and hence markups) are variable, but the economic intuition is fairly simple as the term is completely absent in the vertically integrated case but less than 1 when the elasticity μ is finite and increasing in price
Holding retail pass-through constant, this means lower pass-through.
Offsetting this first force is the term
in the denominator of the arm's-length pass-through equation. This second force (cost channel) arises only when there are retail marginal costs that are positive and not a constant share of production (e.g., Cobb-Douglas). 9 When this is the case, passthrough is increasing in the manufacturer's markup because this markup raises the wholesale price (w = which is amplified by the degree of double marginalization. The cost channel also suggests one mechanism through which the division of tasks between manufacturers and retailers affects arm's-length pass-through. If private labels shift marketing and distribution costs (δ) from manufacturer to retailer, equivalent to a shift from θ m and θ r to θ m − δ and θ r + δ, this raises commodity to wholesale pass-through by more than it lowers wholesale to retail pass-through. The net effect is to increase commodity to retail pass-through for externally manufactured private labels even without any change in manufacturer markups. Note, however, that it makes wholesale-to-retail pass-through lower for vertically integrated and externally manufactured private labels.
A third force (market power channel) highlights the interaction between the horizontal and vertical aspects of the model. Vertical integration affects prices and market shares (p VI q VI > pq), which can potentially affect pass-through. Under many demand systems (including Dornbusch, 1987 , and the one we simulate in the online appendix), firms with larger market shares have lower demand elasticities, higher markups, and higher markup elasticities. This results in lower pass-through for products with higher market share. Thus, while private labels-vertically integrated retailer-manufacturers or merely shifting costs downstream to retailers-can raise pass-through through the first two forces described above, by raising market share, they generate a countervailing force that lowers pass-through.
What determines the strength of these forces? The first force (markup adjustment) will be stronger when the markup elasticities are high and markups are highly variable. The second force (cost share) will be stronger when either retail marginal costs (θ r ) or manufacturer markups (μ) are high. The third force (market power) will be stronger when vertical integration delivers a larger increase in market share and the markup elasticity is more sensitive to market share.
Which force dominates depends on the parameterization of the model, but there are a few general conclusions. For vertically integrated private labels, the markup-adjustment and cost forces go in opposite directions, implying that vertical integration could raise or lower pass-through. For arm's-length private labels, the cost channel raises passthrough. For both types of private labels, the market power channel is an indirect or second-order effect that always lowers pass-through; conditioning on market share always raises pass-through for private labels ceteris paribus. In the online appendix, we present a simple quantitative version of our model using the demand structure from Dornbusch (1987)-a demand structure that generates the standard negative correlation between cost pass-through and market share ceteris paribus. We find that in some cases, vertical integration can generate higher or lower unconditional pass-through than the arm's-length case. When it is lower, conditioning on market share (removing the effect of the market power channel) could reverse the pass-through ranking. Simply shifting costs from the manufacturer to the retailer always raises pass-through. 10 We take four lessons from our model for the empirical analysis:
1. Holding horizontal market structure constant, unconditional commodity pass-through can be higher or lower for vertically integrated private labels compared to national brands, while externally manufactured private labels should have higher pass-through. In general, the effects of vertical integration on pass-through could be quite heterogeneous. 2. Comparing goods with otherwise similar demand, conditioning on market share will raise the commodity pass-through of private labels relative to national brands because private labels will have higher market share and lower pass-through through the market power channel. Omitting market share can bias the coefficient on vertical integration or private labels. 3. Pass-through from wholesale to retail prices should be lower for private labels (vertically integrated or otherwise). 4. Differences in quality/demand (d) or marginal cost shares (c, θ m +θ r ) could confound estimation, so looking at similar goods (sold to similar customers, for example, in the same store) is important.
III. Data
In this section, we describe two scanner data sets we use for our analysis and the variables we construct. The first data 10 In taking our model to data, there are two additional considerations. First, pass-through for multiproduct firms may depend on total firm (brand) market share and not product share. We deal with this by including firm (brand) market share variables. Second, the market power of retailers that carry private label products and the market power of third-party private label manufacturers may be different for other reasons. We address this with our multiretailer data. set (single retailer) includes the retail prices, wholesale costs, and quantities for a large U.S. grocery chain; the second data set from market research firm Symphony IRI tracks multiple retailers. Both track unique universal product codes (UPCs) at the week by store level.
A. Single Retailer Data
Our main data set covers all products sold between January 2004 and June 2007 (178 weeks) for 250 stores throughout the United States, divided into ten divisions. 11 The products sold are mostly food and beverages but also include housekeeping supplies and personal care products. The retailer has a significant private label presence in many categories. Based on publicly available information from the retailer's manufacturing subsidiary, we identify two groups of private label goods: those that are manufactured by the retailer's manufacturing subsidiary (retailer manufactured) and those marketed and branded by the retailer but manufactured by third parties (retailer branded). The remaining goods we classify as national brands that are both manufactured and marketed externally. We restrict our attention to categories that contain both externally branded (national brands) and private label goods.
Our estimation sample is restricted to products purchased at least once a month within a division during the sample period. While we use the full set of products to construct market share variables, this restriction means we do not have to worry about entry and exit or imputation of unobserved prices. We are left with 8,624 products in 149 product categories for our main sample, accounting for over two-thirds of revenue. Out of 149 categories, 20 contain retailermanufactured products, including the categories we link to commodities later (milk, soft drinks, bread, and tomato products).
The data contain three store-level prices: a regular (or list) price; a price net of promotions, coupons, rebates and temporary sales; and a wholesale list price. We compute an unweighted average of the week by store prices at the month by division level. This corresponds to the frequency with which we observe commodity prices (monthly), reduces some of the noise in longer-term price movements, and increases the number of products that we can observe every month of the sample period.
The wholesale list price is self-reported by the retailer and is meant to capture the current replacement price or marginal cost of the retailer. This is the same measure of cost used in Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo (2011), Gopinath et al. (2011) , and Burstein and Jaimovich (2009) . The cost measure may or may not include associated distribution services, since some national brand manufacturers engage in directstore delivery and others ship to warehouses owned and operated by the retailer. The nature of retailer-manufacturer PL-VI and PL-NVI are retailer-manufactured and -branded private labels, respectively, NB is national brands. Single retailer sample: UPCs appearing every month from January 2004 to May 2007 in categories with private labels in the northern California division. Commodity-matched categories: milk, flavored milk, cream, soft drinks, breakfast and lunch bread, canned tomatoes, tomato paste/sauce/puree, ketchup, salsa, pasta sauce. Multiretailer sample: UPC-chain combinations in more than 36 consecutive months from January 2001 to December 2006 in the Los Angeles area (58 chains). Categories: milk, butter, yogurt, soft drinks, and pasta sauce. Retail product and brand shares are within retailer shares. Retailer share is share of category sales in the market going to a retailer. Manufacturer share is market share aggregating across retailers. "Single PL" assumes PLs produced by a single manufacturer; "ind. PL" assumes an independent manufacturer for each retailer.
contracts and promotions also means that this cost measure may not correspond to "the" marginal cost of the retailer; with quantity-based promotions, marginal cost may be variable. Lacking data on these trade promotions, we follow the literature and treat the wholesale cost as the primary component of the retailer's marginal cost (w i in the model) and as equivalent to a manufacturer or producer price. An additional caveat is that the self-reported wholesale prices for retailer-manufactured private labels may not be allocative. As intrafirm prices, they may be accounting fictions for tax avoidance or record-keeping purposes. Given both of these caveats, one of our principal contributions is to consider pass-through from commodity prices or other common category-level cost shifters to retail prices, bypassing the need for product-level wholesale costs completely.
We also use the retailer-provided classification scheme. Product classification is important for measuring the relevant competition and market share (horizontal structure) and to control for differences in commodity cost shares. There is no reason to expect an increase in the price of raw milk to affect the marginal cost of milk and cream by the same amount, but comparing two types of 2% liquid milk may avoid most confounding factors. The products in our sample are classified into 56 groups ("refrigerated dairy"), 149 categories (e.g., "mainstream white milk," "cream"), and 1,444 subclasses (e.g., "low fat 1% milk," "reduced fat 2% organic milk"). Using narrower classifications controls for more product heterogeneity but also results in a very small number of comparison products, excluding products that may be reasonable substitutes and leading to many cases where there is no comparable private label product. Our main specifications compare products within categories, which also roughly corresponds to the aggregation in the multiple retailer data set, but we explore robustness by only comparing pass-through for products within subclass.
We also use the classifications above and the quantity measures in the data to construct retailer-level product and brand shares. We cannot measure a true product-level market share with these data, as many products are sold by other retailers in the same local market, but they still provide information about differences in a product's position versus other products due to differences in price, quality, and local tastes. 12 A product with high-quality or high local tastes can sell more at a given price and, compared to a product with the same marginal cost, may receive a higher markup by manufacturers or retailers. A product with lower price but similar quality and taste can also sell more than its competitors and charge a higher markup. Aggregating sales over the entire sample period, we construct two measures-product share, the revenue from a product divided by revenue from all highly similar products (within a subclass), and brand share, the total revenue for a product's manufacturer as a share of all revenue among broadly similar products (within a category)-at the product × division level. Although our simple model considers single-product firms, the ubiquity of multiproduct manufacturers suggests that it may be the brand or manufacturer share that is more relevant. We identify firms using a combination of the first-five digits of each UPC, which typically identify a unique manufacturer at the time of UPC issuance, and manual inspection. We assume that the retailer's private label products constitute a single unique brand.
We focus on the data from one of the retailer's divisions, as our measures of price changes and product importance constructed at the national level may obscure regional variation in pricing, tastes, and competition. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. About 15% of the products in this sample are retailer private labels, and we identify 30% of these as retailer manufactured. Comparing across the different vertical modes, we see that private label goods typically have a larger product share (within subclass) and a larger brand share (within category) although the standard deviation is high across products. Private label goods have 20% lower average prices than national brands within a subclass but up to 50% lower wholesale costs, with slightly lower prices and costs for retailer-manufactured goods than retailer-branded goods. This is consistent with higher-percentage retail margins (retail price/wholesale cost) implied by our model. We also present descriptive statistics for the commoditymatched sample described in the next section. This sample is disproportionately drawn from categories with retailermanufactured private labels, but the other statistics are fairly similar.
One prediction of our model is that retailer margins are positively correlated with the product and brand share measures within each category. The elasticity of retail margin to market shares is low-0.4% and 2% for our product and brand share variables respectively-but statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the "constant retailer markup" model represents a quantitatively small but observable departure from our data.
B. Commodity and Wholesale Cost Indexes
We supplement our product-level data with two measures of common shocks that should shift the marginal cost of similar goods by a similar amount: commodity prices and wholesale cost indexes. Commodity prices, like exchange rates, are arguably exogenous sources of cost variation at the product level we can use to examine cost pass-through into both wholesale prices and retail prices. We collect monthly prices of raw materials (milk, corn, wheat, and tomatoes). 13 Using commodity prices as the cost measure (independent variable) ensures that a pass-through regression that uses retail prices (dependent variable) uses only allocative, market-based cost measures. Our final set of commoditymatched categories contains milk, flavored milk and cream (matched to dairy), soft drinks (matched to corn, the basis of high-fructose corn syrup), breakfast and lunch commercial breads (matched to wheat) and ketchup, canned tomatoes, tomato sauce/paste/purees, pasta sauce, and salsa (matched to tomatoes).
The main disadvantage of commodity prices is that for many product categories, there is no dominant main ingredient, suggesting that production costs will not be well captured by a commodity index. As an alternative, we construct a category-level wholesale cost index based on the reported wholesale costs in our retailer data. The average category-level movement in wholesale costs over time is likely to capture common movements in the marginal cost of these products as opposed to idiosyncratic demand shocks or production shocks hitting particular manufacturers. A weighted index would be more highly correlated with high market share product by construction, so we use an unweighted index that averages the monthly wholesale cost of all similar products in our sample. 14 Figure 1 presents time-series plots of the twelve-month percent change in the commodity index and associated category-level wholesale and retail indexes. Commodity prices during this period are generally trending up, particularly in late 2006 and early 2007, but the precise timing varies by commodity. Commodity price swings are much larger than those for average wholesale or retail prices. The importance of commodity costs overall is clear for some goods, particularly milk, but we will see that even the fairly flat average wholesale and retail price movements for tomatoes and bread (note the right-hand scale for retail/wholesale indexes) mask substantial heterogeneity in co-movement with commodity prices across individual products.
C. Multiple Retailer Data
Our second data set comes from Symphony IRI, a market research agency (see Bronnenberg, Krueger, & Mela, 2008, for details) . 15 The data have been used extensively in the marketing literature and to examine the cyclicality of prices (Coibion, Gorodnichendko, & Hong, 2015) . The data contain weekly scanner price and quantity information for a panel of stores in multiple markets. Product categories are a subset of those in our retailer data and defined similarly.
We focus on a single market, Los Angeles, and on the categories that have an obvious commodity match and a visual correlation between average retail prices and the commodity index. Figure 1 in the online appendix presents a similar plot to 1 for the multiretailer data. The products in our final set of categories (commodity matches) are milk (dairy), yogurt (dairy), butter (dairy), carbonated beverages (corn), and pasta sauce (tomato). Although the data cover a longer period (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , we restrict ourselves to data from January 2001 to December 2006 because unique private label product identifiers change in 2007, making linkage to later periods unreliable. Retailer identities are scrambled, and private labels are only associated with retailers, which means we cannot identify private label manufacturers (which could be the retailer, national brand manufacturers using excess capacity, or specialized private label manufacturers selling to a single or multiple retailers). This is a major limitation of these data, but given the sensitivity of this information, we are unaware of any data on these linkages. Identifying internal versus outsourced manufacture for our single retailer is already a major innovation of our analysis. The other limitation of the multiretailer data is that they do not contain wholesale cost measures for the retailers or more disaggregated classifications of products. We compute unweighted average prices for each product within a month, except in this case, we have up to 58 retailers for each product. We restrict the sample to products that appear in at least 36 consecutive months. We construct within-chain product share and brand share variables analogous to those in our single-retailer data, only now these potentially vary across retailers (for a product) as well as across products (within a retailer). With multiple retailers, we can also construct two additional measures. Retailer share measures the fraction of all sales in a category at the retail chain level (e.g., the fraction of soft drinks sold through CVS versus Walmart in the Los Angeles area). This captures retailer market power and could affect the retail markup. While larger retailers may have lower pass-through due to higher markups, retailer size may also be associated with distribution and scale economies; for example, Antoniades and Zaniboni (2013) find that exchange rate pass-through into retail prices in the United Arab Emirates is higher for larger retailers. Manufacturer market share measures the fraction of all local market sales within a category for a particular manufacturer aggregating across all retailers (e.g., the fraction of soft drink revenue for Coca-Cola versus Pepsi products in the Los Angeles area). This captures manufacturer market power and affects wholesale markups. For private label products, we can make two extreme assumptions: each retailer's private label has an independent manufacturer, or all private labels have the same manufacturer.
The last two columns in table 1 present descriptive statistics for the multiple retailer data commodity-matched sample we use for our analysis. Within-chain brand shares are fairly similar to what we observe in the single retailer, while product shares are smaller because we cannot define them within subclass and instead use categories. The number of national brands relative to the number of private label goods is a bit lower as we have multiple private label brands. Retailer shares are low on average but very dispersed, as the top four retail chains make up about 60% of revenues in these categories.
The multiple retailer data allow us to consider how well the (within-chain) retail quantities in the single-retailer data set proxy for the manufacturer (across-chain) quantities across products. On average, we would expect popular products (e.g., 2 liter Coca-Cola bottles) to be sold by more retailers and to have high shares for most retailers, but retailer assortment and shopper preferences may vary. We find that the correlation between these two measures is very high across products-0.88 for products and 0.97 for brands-suggesting that for national brands, the withinchain shares are an excellent though imperfect proxy for manufacturer market power (figure 2). When we include private label brands and assume that each is manufactured by an independent company, these correlations drop considerably to 0.45 and 0.65 as expected.
IV. Pass-Through Heterogeneity
Our preferred pass-through estimator is based on a rollingwindow specification where we regress a change in log price over some period on a change in log cost over the same period. In the robustness section, we consider two other pass-through concepts often used in the literature: distributed lag and conditional on price change. We interact the change in log cost over a specified period with dummies for retailer-manufactured or retailer-branded products and with product shares and brand shares in some specifications. These interaction terms capture heterogeneity in cost pass-through in this framework and are the main variables of interest. Depending on the cost measure in question and whether we are pooling across categories, we also include category dummies interacted with the cost measure. By allowing for differential pass-through across categories, this helps account for an abundance of private label or high-market-share products in categories by using only within-category pass-through variation. As figure 1 and online appendix figure 1 reveal, commodity pass-through is heterogeneous across categories. For the single-retailer data, the full estimating equation is
where i is a UPC, c is a category, t is a month, and Δ h is a time lag operator for horizon h. 16 We include UPC fixed effects to control for product-specific linear time trends. In our benchmark specification, we set h = 12 using twelve month overlapping windows. Standard errors are clustered at the UPC level, allowing for serial correlation of the error term. Note that the interpretation of our pass-through measure is similar to Amiti et al. (2014) : the equilibrium comovement between the price of the product and an aggregate cost shifter (the exchange rate in their case, commodity prices in ours). This is different from the pass-through concept sometimes considered in the literature, which is the change in price for a single firm or product given an exogenous shock. 
A. Main Results
Table 2 presents our main commodity pass-through results. In panel A, we show the pass-through from commodity prices to regular retail prices for some individual categories. The first and fourth columns present categorylevel pass-through from the commodity price to the average retail price index already described. These reveal substantial heterogeneity in the degree to which retail prices respond to raw input prices across product categories-from as high as 30% for milk to as low as 1% for tomato products. This aggregate category pass-through likely captures differences in both the importance of the material input in total costs and market structure across categories.
The second and fifth columns present product-level passthrough interacted with category dummies and retailermanufactured and retailer-branded dummies. The retailermanufactured interaction is highly significant and positive for three of the four commodities, implying higher passthrough for these products. The retailer-branded dummy is positive for one of the two sets of products that feature externally manufactured but retailer-branded products.
As the direct effect of double marginalization on passthrough may be confounded by differences in horizontal market power, the fourth and sixth columns add the product share and brand share interactions. The brand share within a category is negative and highly significant for three of the four groups of goods, while the product share is typically negative but not significant. The importance of accounting for horizontal market structure when measuring the effects of vertical market structure is revealed through the substantial increase in magnitude of the coefficients for retailer-manufactured and retailer-branded goods: all four of the retailer-manufactured interactions are now highly significant and positive, as are both of the retailer-branded interactions. This supports our theoretical demonstration that there is a potential bias in estimates of vertical effects when the vertical characteristic is correlated with horizontal market power.
In panel B of table 2, we pool all of the goods from panel A and present results where the dependent variable is the change in log regular price, the change in log sale price, and the change in log wholesale cost. The results are similar to panel A for the most part with larger positive coefficients for retailer-manufactured than retailer-branded goods and negative coefficients for the brand share variable. As in panel A, inclusion of product and brand share variables tends to increase the magnitude of the vertical integration variables. In both panels A and B, the magnitudes of the vertical integration variables are economically large both absolutely and relative to the horizontal variables. For low pass-through categories like tomato products and bread, aggregate category pass-through is close to 0, but pass-through for vertically integrated products is on the order of 3% to 10%; in high pass-through categories like milk, the pass-through for vertically integrated products is over twice as high conditional on market size.
To consider a larger range of products, in table 3 we replace commodity prices with the unweighted group-level wholesale cost index described above. This specification allows us to consider all of the categories that contain a mixture of retailer-manufactured and retailer-branded products. This measure also potentially captures a wider share of the common cost pressures facing firms, but at the cost of potentially greater endogeneity. In these regressions, we do not include brand share variables because of reverse causality by construction; brands with many products will have larger weight in the index, inducing a higher degree of comovement and generating an upward bias to our estimates. Product share within a subclass will not be correlated with the index as the index is unweighted.
In column 1, we present product-level pass-through from the group wholesale cost index to retail prices, including interactions with the vertical dummies. We find a positive and significant difference for retailer-manufactured goods but not for retailer-branded goods compared to other products. In column 2, we add the product share control, which increases the magnitude of both vertical interactions, with retailer-branded goods becoming statistically significant. In column 3, we allow for differential pass-through from the group wholesale cost index to retail prices for each category. This gives similar results to column 2, except the magnitude of retailer-manufactured goods interaction is reduced (yet still twice the size of the coefficient for retailer-branded goods). This pattern suggests that retailer-manufactured goods tend to be situated in categories with a high passthrough from average common costs to retail prices.
Columns 4 through 6 repeat the first three columns using a six-month rolling window specification, which gives similar results. Finally, in column 7, we use sales prices instead of regular prices with a twelve-month window, which also gives qualitatively similar results. Overall, the results of table 3 confirm that the patterns of cost pass-through established in table 2 seem to hold on average across a much wider range of product categories than the ones that can be easily matched to commodity prices.
In table 4, we examine pass-through from product-level wholesale costs to product-level retail prices. In contrast to tables 2 and 3, costs now vary at the product level. We suggest caution in interpreting these results given the earlier discussion of whether the product-level wholesale costs reported in our data set are allocative, particularly for retailer-manufactured products. On average, over a 12-month window, pass-through from a product's wholesale cost to the regular retail price is about 25%. Column 1 includes the vertical dummy interactions. We find that pass-through for retailer-manufactured goods appears to be similar to externally branded products, but pass-through for retailer-branded private label goods is lower. Recall that this is consistent with our theoretical framework and is driven by the greater share of marginal costs carried by the retailer for these goods. Column 2 adds the product and brand share variables, while column 3 adds interactions of category dummies with the wholesale cost changes.
In general, the effects of horizontal market share are quite mixed for pass-through at this level, with some positive and negative coefficients with significance and some zeros, and none of the magnitudes are large. Thus, while the data do not support a model of constant retail gross margins over the wholesale costs in our data, they do suggest that market share differences across products (as opposed to, say, across retailers) have a smaller effect on retail markups than manufacturer markups.
Columns 4 through 6 consider a six-month rolling window, and column 7 considers sales prices instead of regular prices. The effects are fairly similar, although pass-through for retailer-manufactured goods also appears to be lower in these specifications. 17
B. Robustness
For our first set of robustness checks, we allow much more flexible heterogeneity in pass-through across products. To do this, we follow a two-step procedure where we first estimate product-level pass-through, with no controls, and then regress this estimated pass-through coefficient on various controls. While we lose some efficiency, this eases the computational burden relative to a model with hundreds or thousands of interaction terms. The first-step specification is
17 Our results on incomplete wholesale to retail pass-through are generally consistent with Eichenbaum et al. (2011) , who find that reference prices frequently do not respond to reference cost changes, resulting in a 9% standard deviation of the reference markup for the average UPC over time. They do find higher pass-through conditional on a price change, but their concept of "reference" prices, their store and product sample, and their level of aggregation all differ from ours. and the second step is given bŷ
with similar indexes to before. We use OLS with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Given the very wide range of estimated product level pass-through coefficients owing to the timing of individual price changes and idiosyncratic factors, we trim the tails of the first-step pass-through for the second-stage estimation. This still leaves us with a wide range of positive and negative estimated first-stage coefficients. 18 While negative product-level pass-through coefficients are difficult to interpret and may simply reflect the low explanatory power of our cost variables, they are not uncommon in the pass-through literature (Misra et al., 2010; Berger et al., 2011) . The results from the second step of our two-step procedure are reported in table 5. The first four columns regress wholesale index and commodity price pass-through coefficients on the same market structure variables as earlier, but also include subclass dummies (108 for pooled commodity passthrough and 1,334 for wholesale index pass-through). We are thereby comparing pass-through across different products within very narrowly defined product classifications, which again helps account for selection of retailer-manufactured and retailer-branded products (or high/low market share brands) into higher or lower pass-through categories. The signs and magnitudes are similar to tables 2 and 3, although the statistical significance is somewhat lower.
In columns 5 and 6, we consider an alternative first-step commodity pass-through specification using distributed lags that is common in the pass-through literature (Gopinath & Itskhoki, 2010; Neiman, 2010) . We regress the one-month change in retail price on the one-month change in commodity 18 We use 10% cutoffs for first-step coefficients. Commodity results are not sensitive to using much smaller cutoffs (e.g., 1% tails), as the range of first-stage pass-through estimates is small. Results using the wholesale index are more sensitive to extreme individual pass-through coefficients. The 10% cutoffs we use correspond to −256% and 348% (versus only −46% and 48% for commodity pass-through).
price and eleven lags of the one-month change in commodity prices:
This specification allows for more flexible pass-through dynamics and also allows us to increase the sample period by twelve months because we can observe commodity prices in the periods before our retailer data begin in January 2004.
The pass-through concept we use in the second step is the long-term pass-through given by the sum of the lagged coefficients as described byβ i in equation (9). The results from this exercise are also quantitatively similar to our earlier results, with significantly higher pass-through for retailermanufactured and -branded goods and lower pass-through for brands with larger market shares. Finally, in column 7, we consider whether our horizontal variables are really capturing differences in market power or are simply capturing differences in the share of marginal costs affected by the commodity price that are systematically correlated with product and brand market shares. We do this by broadening our first-step sample to include all of the operating areas in our data set-ten in total-and estimating pass-through for each. This gives us up to ten pass-through coefficients per UPC-one for each area. We then include UPC-level fixed effects in the second-step regression, which means that identifying variation in product shares within subclass and brand shares within category comes only from differences in these variables across operating areas for the same UPC. We also include operating area fixed effects to capture average differences in retail competition across areas. Note that in this case, we cannot include the vertical variables as these vary by product, not operating areas. The brand share coefficient is significant and has a similar magnitude to our earlier findings, but the product share within subclass has a positive effect on pass-through. Combined with our results using subclass dummies, this robustness ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is first-step pass-through to retail price. Regressions based on equation (8). Each observation is a UPC-level pass-through coefficient from a first-step regression using either the twelve-month rolling-window (RW, equation [7] ) or twelve-month distributed lag (lag, equation [9] ). The main division is northern California, while "All" includes ten divisions throughout the United States. See table 1 notes for a sample description.
exercise suggests that the effect of our brand share variable on commodity cost pass-through is not driven by differences across products in the sensitivity of manufacturing costs to commodity prices that happen to be correlated with brand share. Instead, it suggests that variation in market power (whether due to, e.g., different tastes, costs, competition) and variable markups across regions can explain some of the pass-through heterogeneity across products as in our model.
Our second set of robustness checks considers an alternative definition of pass-through from the ones already discussed. The pass-through effects we identified previously may be driven by differences in the frequency of price adjustment for a constant rate of pass-through conditional on price adjustment and/or by differences in pass-through conditional on price adjustment. At the longer horizons we consider (twelve months), most products change price at least once, but price adjustment frequency would still have an impact on our estimates. To help separate these effects, we consider conditional pass-through where we measure the change in commodity or product-level wholesale costs between two observed retail price changes. Each pass-through spell will thus vary in length, and some products will be dropped because they do not feature at least two observed retail price changes during the sample period. We identify a price change as a month-to-month regular retail price change of over 5%. We drop the small number of products with more than thirteen price changes during our period (less than 0.5% of the sample). We include the length of each conditional spell to capture linear time trends and interact this variable with the market structure variables as well. We use a one-step regression framework similar to before, given by ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered by UPC in parentheses. Dependent variable is change in log retail price over spell. Regressions based on equation (10). All regressions include category × cost interactions. We also control for the number of months elapsed during the price spell interacted with retailer-branded and -manufactured dummies and product and brand market share variables to capture differential linear time trends. Each observation corresponds to a UPC price spell between two observed price changes greater than 5%. See table 1 notes for a sample description.
where ki indexes the different spells for product i between two observed price changes. We allow for variable passthrough across categories (hence, the c index on β above). Standard errors are clustered by UPC. Table 6 presents the results from estimating pass-through conditional on price change. Columns 1 and 2 report results for commodity to regular price pass-through. The results are fairly consistent with our results in table 2, except the brand share variable loses significance (the magnitude is similar) and the retailer-manufactured interaction is smaller (though still about twice the size of the retailer-branded interaction). 19 Columns 3 and 4 report results using product-level wholesale costs. The results are also similar to table 4 both qualitatively and quantitatively, with lower pass-through for retailer-branded products, slightly lower or 0 coefficient on the retailer-manufactured products, and generally insignificant coefficients on the market share variables. Together, these results suggest that our results are related to desired 19 In results not reported here, we found that the frequency of price changes is higher for private label goods. This is consistent with the results for import prices in Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) , where frequency and conditional pass-through are mutually reinforcing for fixed-horizon pass-through as in the lagged or rolling window specifications. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by UPC in parentheses. Dependent variable is twelve-month change in log price. Reported coefficients are interactions with twelve-month change in log commodity price index. Regressions based on equation (6) where each product is now defined as a chain-UPC combination. All specifications include retail chain, category and month fixed effects, category dummies interacted with the change in commodity prices, and uninteracted variables for interaction terms. The large chains sample includes only the 4 largest retailers out 58 in the Los Angeles sample. See table 1 notes for description of multiretailer sample and variables.
long-run pass-through of cost changes and not just differences in menu costs and other factors generating nominal rigidities between goods.
C. Multiple Retailer Results
For the multiple retailer data, our empirical specification is analogous to the one-step pass-through results of section IVB, with one key difference: each observation is no longer a twelve-month price change for a UPC but twelve-month price change for a UPC-chain combination. This allows us to include interaction variables that vary by chain (retail market share), by brand (manufacturer market share), and chain-UPC/brand (i.e., within-chain product and brand share analogous to the single-retailer variables). For these results, we report the interaction of cost changes with a single private label dummy as we have no data on the identity of private label manufacturers. Table 7 presents results pooling across all of our categories matched to commodities. All specifications include month dummies as well as chain and category dummies that allow for different linear trends. Standard errors are clustered by product, allowing for correlation in the error term over time and across retailers. As before, we include categorycommodity interaction dummies to allow pass-through to vary for each category-commodity interaction and ensure that identification of private label and market share interactions comes only from within-category variation in these variables. We also include the uninteracted version of the private label and market share variables where applicable.
Column 1 includes only the private label interaction, and we observe a positive and significant coefficient that lies between the pooled coefficients for retailer-manufactured and retailer-branded private labels in the single retailer data. Since we use roughly the same set of categories matched to products, this is not entirely surprising but emphasizes once again the importance of distinguishing the manufacturer of private labels for inference on vertical structure that is possible with retail scanner data. Column 2 adds the within-chain product and brand share measures analogous to our singleretailer data. While the brand share is similarly negative and significant, it is about half the magnitude. More surprising, the product share variable enters positively. Although this was sometimes the case earlier, the coefficient was almost never significant. Perhaps as a consequence of this and the fact that private label products have higher product shares on average than national brands, the coefficient on the private label interaction is actually smaller when we add these horizontal variables, although we cannot reject statistical equality. 20 Thus, while the private label price dynamics we identified earlier appear to be quite general, the effects of horizontal market structure may be less general across different retailers. This might be expected given the different types of loss leader and marketing strategies employed by various retailers and the fact that the Symphony IRI data contain both large grocery chains (similar to our single retailer) as well as drug and convenience stores with different pricing strategies.
Column 3 interacts the retailer share of category measure with the change in commodity prices and finds that commodity to retail price pass-through appears to be higher for retailers with larger shares of a category within the LA market. This is at odds with a simple market power story, although it is consistent with some other findings in the literature (Antoniades & Zaniboni, 2013) . Column 4 includes the manufacturer market share measure (aggregation across all retailers), where the private label goods of all retailers are treated as having a single manufacturer. Column 5 includes the same measure under the alternative assumption that the private label goods of each retailer have an independent manufacturer. While the private label interaction remains positive and significant in both specifications, in column 5 part of the private label effect appears to load onto the highly negative and significant manufacturer market share. This is because under this assumption, private label manufacturers are very small. The true interaction of horizontal market structure at the manufacturer level and vertical manufacturer-retailer relationships likely lies between these two estimates, highlighting that part of the effect of private labels may be coming through diminished manufacturer market power. This may be more likely when smaller third-party manufacturers sell to large retailers, as double-marginalization would be less problematic in these cases and the higher pass-through for private labels may be mostly due to the horizontal characteristic of the manufacturer rather than the vertical dimension of the relationship.
In columns 6 and 7 of table 7, we combine all of our earlier market share measures even though the correlation between retailer brand shares and manufacturer brand shares is quite high (see figure 2) . The individual coefficients are fairly stable in column 6, although we lose precision in estimating the within-retailer brand share variable. Column 7 restricts our sample to the four largest retailers, which together make up close to 60% of the total retail market share in the Symphony IRI data for Los Angeles. The private label interaction remains similar, but restricting to these larger retail chains significantly changes the sign and magnitude of two coefficients. The retailer share of category measure is now negative and significant, suggesting that retailers may price products in a manner consistent with our standard model of oligopolistic competition, provided they are similar enough technologically. The other main difference is that the coefficient on the manufacturer market share interaction is now negative and significant, even using the definition that assumes a single private label manufacturer.
Altogether, the results using our multiple retailer are for the most part qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with our single retailer results. Looking at similar categorycommodity combinations for multiple retailers over a longer time horizon, we find that private labels feature higher pass-through than national brands, to an extent that lies somewhere in between our single-retailer findings for vertically integrated private labels and outsourced private labels. Although this finding is robust to various within-and acrossretailer market share measures, the effects of market shares themselves on commodity to retail pass-through are less robust across specifications and appear to depend on the type of retail chains considered (large or small) and how we impute manufacturer shares to private label products given the lack of data available. Thus, while the direction of bias from ignoring horizontal competition is less straightforward in the multiretailer data, the data nevertheless emphasize that horizontal market structure is likely to affect inference on the effects of vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers.
D. Discussion
To interpret magnitudes, note from table 1 that the mean and standard deviation of product and brand shares for our commodity matched sample are about 0.14. The brand share interaction coefficient in panel A of table 2 is similar in magnitude to the uninteracted cost-change coefficient, implying that a 1 standard deviation increase in market share lowers pass-through by roughly 14% for national brands and that a monopolist in our setting would have close to 0 cost passthrough. The vertical effects we estimate are much larger. The retailer-manufactured interaction coefficient is comparable in magnitude to the coefficient on brand share in the individual and pooled commodity regressions, implying that vertical integration is equivalent to a multiple standard deviation decrease in brand share in terms of its effectiveness in raising pass-through. The externally manufactured private label effect on pass-through is smaller in magnitude but still large relative to the horizontal effects. Interpreted in light of our theoretical analysis, these results suggest that the doublemarginalization effect of vertical integration dominates the cost-shifting and horizontal market power effects.
Although our multiple retailer results imply that horizontal market power matters at both the retailer and manufacturer levels, they also suggest that the importance of horizontal variables is sensitive to measurement issues (i.e., who manufactures private labels) and different pricing strategies across retailers (e.g., differences between large and small retailers and differences across products within a brand). The private label effects are consistent, with magnitudes that once again suggest that vertical manufacturer-retailer relationships are quantitatively important relative to horizontal factors.
Thus, the main and most robust conclusion of our analysis is that private label goods increase commodity to retail price pass-through, particularly when there is vertical integration between retailer and manufacturer. How much this effect comes from the size of private label manufacturers themselves (particularly relative to large retailers) or from the fact that firms are able to overcome double marginalization is difficult to answer with existing data. Regardless of the mechanism behind our findings, our results indicate that the ongoing trend toward large retailers in North America and likely expansion of private label market share will increase the sensitivity of retail prices to cost shocks. They also suggest that countries like the United Kingdom and Switzerland with high private label shares should display a similar pattern. However, our finding of negative effects on pass-through for retailer market share among large chains implies some potential offset. The net contribution of retail concentration to pass-through depends on how this affects private label product introductions, the mode of private label entry (manufactured internally or externally), and which retail and manufacturing firms lose market share as a consequence. While a comprehensive investigation of these issues is beyond our scope in this paper, our results emphasize the importance of considering the interactions between horizontal and vertical market structure in retail and manufacturing.
An additional implication of our findings is that aggregate retail pass-through in the United States could inherit the countercyclicality of private label market share. While cyclical variation in private label shares is small relative to secular trends and cross-country differences, this is a novel prediction to our knowledge. Alongside the effects of recessions on retail and manufacturer consolidation and on brand switching and customer loyalty (Lamey et al., 2007) , this aspect of retail prices merits further investigation alongside recent research research analyzing the cyclicality of sales and trade promotion (Coibion et al., 2015; Anderson et al., 2013) .
V. Conclusion
We provide evidence on the effects of horizontal and vertical market structure on two links of the commodity to retail price pass-through chain. Our evidence is generally consistent with the previous literature: double marginalization reduces pass-through (vertical effect) and firms with larger market shares have lower pass-through (horizontal effect). Crucially, the effects of vertical integration on pass-through hold when considering two allocative prices in lieu of an intrafirm price and appear to depend on the extent of integration. However, our findings also stress that the interaction of vertical and horizontal effects is important. Reducing double marginalization can simultaneously increase passthrough directly and indirectly lower it by increasing market share. The size of the upstream partner involved in vertical integration relative to arm's-length partners may also vary. Thus, estimates of the effects of vertical integration on pass-through are likely to be highly sensitive to the horizontal competition facing both upstream and downstream parties. In our particular setting, we find that the vertical effect associated with private labels appears to dominate effects associated with horizontal market power upstream or downstream.
Our findings suggest several avenues for future research. Long-term trends in retail consolidation and market power generate large differences in private label shares. This is particularly evident in the cross-section of countries, as several European countries have private label shares around 50% versus about 20% in North America. Because the associated high retail concentration (and effects on manufacturer concentration) may have additional effects on cost pass-through, a comparison of commodity to retail pass-through across countries or markets with very different retail/manufacturer concentrations would help translate our micro findings into more direct macro implications. This is likely to require both a more structural, general equilibrium approach, as well as better measurement of retailer-manufacturer relationships and private label manufacturer identities than is currently available. Beyond retailer-manufacturer relationships, our results also suggest that revisiting recent findings on vertical integration in international trade (e.g., Neiman, 2010) with data that allow measurement of horizontal competition will yield additional insights. Whether changes in vertical and horizontal relationships between firms play a large role in longer-term trends in exchange rate passthrough to import and retail prices is an open question, but some recent work combining exchange rate shocks, vertical relationships, import prices and retail prices (Berger et al., 2011; Amiti et al., 2014; Antoniades & Zaniboni, 2013) indicates that such data are becoming available, and there is scope for progress on these questions.
